

5

Conclusion***Work-ing Alliances, Net-working Democracy***

WHENEVER ONE THEORIZES about moral diversity the "question" of universalism or the "problem" of relativism is inevitably raised. The last two chapters have suggested that the question of universalism and relativism is not about a binary opposition, where the universal names that which is generally normative and the relative names norms which are particular to a specific group or locality. Chapter 3 suggests that universals may themselves be specific, developed in a particular location, and yet, simultaneously articulate universal claims. These particular universals are not necessarily "false universalism." After all stark relativism is itself based on the universal claim that universals are always false (Pfeil 1994, 224). Rather, the question is the relation between the particular and the universal and the implication of any given universal. Chapter 3 shows that Black womanist ethics is a specific ethics in relation to universal struggles, while chapters 3 and 4 suggest that western rationality is also a specific or particular universal, developed in a specific location, tied to a particular set of hopes and dreams, but dedicated to a universal equality and respect for all human beings. Those hopes and dreams have not been realized in modern social formations. Chapter 4 also suggests that the "problem" of relativism, the need for criteria to choose among ethics, may be misplaced; the moral question posed by diverse and complex ethics is not how to "choose" or to "judge" among them but how to work in and with that diversity and complexity.

The "problem" of relativism is often posed as if the fact that various ethics are relative to one another means that they are indistinguishable, they are all the same, equally valid and valuable and hence there is no way to choose among them. Chapter 4, however, suggests another possible interpretation of relativism. If norms or moral traditions are relative, they are relative to one another—relativism names a site of relation. Thus, I suggest that ethical relativism is about relational work in and among diverse ethics, including diverse universals. I am not suggesting that ethical universals should be eschewed, but I am suggesting that they be relativized, in other words that the intertwining of the universal and relative be recognized. My hope is twofold: 1) to challenge, through a reading of relativism as relationalism, the facile nature of the charge of relativism (a charge which is frequently made as if the term "relativism"

required no specific explanation); and 2) through this re-reading, to challenge the usefulness of the opposition between universalism and relativism and, thereby, open the door to new understandings of universalism as well. Because the critique of relativism is the major critique of moral diversity, a critique which is maintained, albeit in different forms, by both conservative critics and progressive critics, it is necessary to first consider these concerns directly before moving on to reinterpretation.²⁰⁰

In her groundbreaking book *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care*, Joan C. Tronto (1993) argues in relation to Anthony Cortese's (1990) advocacy in *Ethnic Ethics: The Restructuring of Moral Theory* of "a pluralistic theory of moral development" (Cortese 1990, 92, quoted in Tronto 1993, 94) that "two problems confront a simple claim for pluralism against the universalism boundary." In delineating the problems, Tronto succinctly lays out two sides of what is frequently articulated as the "problem of relativism":²⁰¹

First, to make a claim for moral pluralism sidesteps the difficult problem of relativism. If there are many sets of moral values, how does one decide among them? Second, and in some ways a related problem, to suggest the desirability of moral pluralism is to ignore the relative power of different moral conceptions. If the powerful maintain that moral universalism is the only true morality, then when subgroups call for moral pluralism they seem necessarily to be calling for the preservation of a lesser type of moral theory. (94)

Cortese, however, is not making a simple claim for pluralism. He is making a set of claims which advocate pluralism and question universalism, but which also question whether modern moral reasoning misses the most important aspects of moral life. He argues, "Relationships, not reason nor justice, are the essence of life and morality" (157). Tronto would certainly agree with this final point, but she believes that an ethics of care can incorporate universalism, whereas for Cortese, recognizing a substantive moral life, implies similarly recognizing moral pluralism.²⁰² Cortese comes to this conclusion by questioning a number of issues and assumptions which are crystallized in claims for ethical "universalism" through a history of the intertwining of ethical, social, and psychological theory from Kant through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Piaget, and Kohlberg to Habermas.²⁰³ Various characteristics—rationality, autonomy, and equality—are all invoked in modern claims for universalism. This configuration of issues works to manage a series of ambiguous meanings founded in fundamental splits—between subject and object, between the individual and society, between the individual as similarly equal to all other individuals and the individual as uniquely different from all others.²⁰⁴ Thus, relativism, in the terms of contextualized pluralism advocated by Cortese, is read

by critics as if it also invokes social determinism over against the freedom of agency. Heteronomy is opposed to autonomy, multiplicity to singularity, and, completing the circle, relativism to universalism.

This matrix is precisely the type of circular, loosely structured web of binary oppositions described by Catherine Bell (1992) as structuring a worldview based on hierarchies inscribed in the binaries. This worldview is itself a specific, historically produced ethical tradition, which as Bell suggests, appears within its own terms to be both natural and necessary, but outside the particular tradition or historical conditions is neither. Suggestions, like Tronto's, that it is necessary to rationally "decide" among moralities, work to protect the moral agent from heteronomy, to construct the agent as free from the determinism of arbitrary decisionism. Most importantly, the invocation of the necessity to "decide" operates to reinforce the entire set of binaries connected to universalism-relativism as necessary. Cortese argues alternatively, that the location of agency in rational decision-making attempts to make coherent a complex matrix of gaps and slippages between the social and the individual, freedom and determinism through a rationality which both constrains behavior and produces the supposedly autonomous individual, an individual who is simultaneously the subject of agency and subjected to the discourses through which she is produced. Both rationality and moral agency are not free from, but remain implicated in, the histories and contexts that produce them. Placing morality fully within the context of relationships does not do away with rationality, but it does shift the meaning of ethics and opens the door to contextualized pluralism, what I have termed a "complex pluralism."

Consider the second side of Tronto's criticism: "Second, and in some ways a related problem, to suggest the desirability of moral pluralism is to ignore the relative power of different moral conceptions. If the powerful maintain that moral universalism is the only true morality, then when subgroups call for moral pluralism they seem necessarily to be calling for the preservation of a lesser type of moral theory" (94). Tronto here assumes that "subgroups" will not be calling for moral universalism, an assumption which *Black Womanist Ethics* challenges. Yet, Tronto's claim can also be read as if moral pluralism in and of itself undermines the possibility of criticizing dominative power relations—if each plurality carries the same claim to "truth," then the critique of domination has no more claim to truth or legitimacy than the enactment of domination. The possibility that relativism undermines the critique of dominative power relations is one which a number of progressive critics take up. Yet, as Cannon's and Hoagland's texts show, the critique of domination can be carried out from particular perspectives and is perhaps most effective when those perspectives are allied.

The question is whether the critique of apolitical or politically ineffective pluralism that Tronto wants to make must turn only (and seemingly irresistibly)

back toward some type of unity or universalism. For example, Fred Pfeil (1994) raises these same issues.²⁰⁵ Pfeil's concerns are also laid out around two points of potential difficulty. The first is that persons and movements will be trapped *in* difference. He worries that the invocation of differences establishes unbridgeable chasms of difference, thus, reinforcing the inability to talk to, with, or about an-other. These chasms imply that those who place a primary value on "difference" will not be able to respond either ethically or politically to situations where difference is engaged. On the other hand, Pfeil is also concerned along with Nelly Richard (1987/88) that an uncritical postmodernism can accomplish this devolution by integrating the other back into a framework which absorbs all differences and contradictions, where "differences" lose any specificity and operate in the (undifferentiated) space of absolute difference. This concern reflects the loss of diversity if the space *between* differences is the only site of activity. For Pfeil unity and universalism appear necessary to address these problems. Thus, he quotes approvingly Sabina Lovibond's call for a unity that leads to the "eventual convergence with those of all other egalitarian or liberationist movements" (Lovibond 1989, 28, quoted in Pfeil 1994, 224). Does the call for eventual convergence fully articulate the complexity of relations "in-between"? If the spaces in-between difference and unity, relative and universal go unarticulated and, hence, ineffectively practiced, the potential to articulate an entire series of (complex) relational possibilities is lost.

Complicating Terms

Diversity can be variously articulated in relation to universalisms, and the complexity of these articulations delimits the possible political effects of the invocation of universal (or particular) norms. Andrée Nicola McLaughlin (1990), for example, suggests that Black women's "quest for human wholeness," is part of a universal resistance to domination based on the diversity of meanings of Black politics in the contemporary post-colonial situation. McLaughlin delineates the various meanings of Black politics and the differences among African-American, Afro-Caribbean, South Asian, and Black British "subjects" as just some of the pluralities necessary to common political struggle against domination. Alternatively, Joan Scott (1995) suggests that there are multiple (at least two) universalisms—universalisms which are both contradictory and interdependent—operating within the enlightenment universalism historically constituted through the French Revolution and French republicanism. The universal equality of individuals which republicanism claimed to be predicated upon, but which was simultaneously the product of republicanism, intertwined with notions of the universality of difference. Because the very meaning of the "individual" was based on the differentiation of one "individual" from another, "individuality required the very difference

that the idea of the proto-typical human individual was meant to deny" (3–4). This difference, which abstract individualism simultaneously depended upon and denied, could be used to exclude those marked as different from the "universal" rights of citizenship.²⁰⁶

Claims for the singularity of modern universalism are also made through a narrative of historical "progression" (that matches a supposed logical progression) in which all universalisms "other" than the "one" universalism of modern rationalism are located simply as traditions over against modernity. Here tradition is assumed to precede and be superseded by modernity.²⁰⁷ This progress narrative is, then, one means of eliding the complexity of the relationship between universal and relative as well as modernity and tradition. Naomi Schor (1995) argues, however, "speaking from a strictly logical perspective, particularity does not always *precede* universalization. . . . what appears to be a prior cause (i.e., particularity) is in fact a subsequent effect" (22, emphasis in original). On this reading particularity is not prior to and superseded by universalism, but rather, particularity is produced by the need of universalism to distinguish itself. Moreover, the examples from the various chapters of this book, show the historical relationships among "traditions," including modern universalism, to be variable. So, for example, Black womanist ethics is a tradition which draws on historical elements preceding modernity (in terms of African "survivals"), elements in critical relation to modernity (the critique of capitalism), and non-modern elements co-temporal with modernity (the specific universalism of the struggle for human wholeness as articulated by the Black Church). Lesbian ethics, alternatively, can be conceptualized as reversing the order of relation. If one accepts the argument that gay and lesbian "identity" developed out of the modern period, lesbian ethics is a tradition which proceeds from (and supersedes?), rather than preceding, modernity. Linda Zerilli (1993) suggests that it is the work of lesbian theorist Monique Wittig precisely to write lesbians into the space of the universal as "the trojan horse of universalism."²⁰⁸ The move on the part of Wittig to write lesbians into the universal is so powerful, as was Sojourner Truth's similar move to speak herself into the universal, because Wittig and Truth do not simply draw on the tradition of modern universalism, working simply to expand the already existent universal to include them within its normative boundaries, so that the universal continues to subsume the particular. As Schor points out, while Wittig's universal is claimed in relation to traditions of French thought, in claiming the specifically lesbian as the site of the universal, it challenges the traditional construction of French universalism which Scott argues is based on a masculinity which in its monogamous heteronormativity is contrasted to "primitive" cultures and, thus, secures French imperialism. Thus, Wittig challenges the normative shape of the universal, moving it to new locations and complicating the relationship between the universal and the particular.²⁰⁹ These examples show

that the relations between traditions and modernity are not structured by historical development, but by historical and contemporary conflict and on-going relational possibility. Modernity does not contain the conflicts of various particular traditions within its frame, but is rather a participant in conflict. The shape of the space in-between traditions and modernity and the work which it allows will determine in what ways this conflict is productive.

In sum "relativism" is a problem because it assumes that any moral configuration other than modern universalism leaves a pluralism in which all moral claims carry equal value. An alternative to either this liberal (in its most conservative sense) pluralism or modern universalism can be constructed by reworking the meaning of "relative." To be "relative" is not to be "same," but to "have a connection or be pertinent to," "to result from or depend on a relation," to be "intelligible only in relation to," "to refer to, relate to or qualify" (Funk and Wagnells). Thus, for norms and values to be relative is not for all norms and values to be the same or equal, but for them to exist in relation to other norms and values, just as I have suggested modern universalism exists in relation. In this sense, relativism is not a problem, but the context of moral activity. This context appears to be a "problem" because autonomous individualism has a "problem" with relationships which threaten to determine it, to leave the individual in the grip of socially determined multiplicity (heteronomy). I would suggest, however, that to locate morality in relationships opens rather than determines moral possibilities. Relationships among diverse and complex persons and communities create possibilities for critique of existing social relations, for the knowledge that life could be otherwise, for the possibility of change. Yet, these possibilities are not the straightforward actions of the autonomous individual, the determinations of a completely free will. Rather, they are always the complex possibilities of moral agents working in the context of relationships.

Articulating morality through complexity opens moral possibilities, in part, because the more connections among specific social units, the more complex the interactions, and the more complex the interactions the more opportunities for freedom.²¹⁰ Because complexity challenges the containment of diversity within clearly bounded "units" it frees space for various interactions beyond the bounds of such containment. Thus, complexity provides an important alternative starting point for the theorizing of freedom and democracy. In contrast to liberal economic and political theory where freedom is located precisely in the separation of clearly bounded individuals, in freedom from attachments, this view suggests that freedom can be located in the complexities of interrelation. Placing complexity at the center of analysis implies that solidarity rather than identity is constitutive of public life and that diversity and its accompanying complexity can be the source of (rather than threats to) public activity and democracy. This possibility suggests that working political alliances,

rather than simply being the result of brokered interests among individual units of activity, can become sites which transform particular needs and interests and reconstitute the "public" (Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1989). Craig Calhoun (1993) argues for "taking difference seriously while trying to avoid relativism and speak generally" (41). If, however, relativism is relationalism, is the sets of relation in, between, and among different sites of ethical and political activity, then relativism is not opposed to the generality which is supposed to define the public sphere, but is in fact the very discourse through which publicity is built, while *différance* remains the limit to that publicity, the horizon which reminds us that no relationship can ever be fully articulated and, thus, the public can never be closed. Democratic contestation will always be necessary, and the ground of the public is the risky ground of decision in the face of ultimate undecidability.

Complexity, Alliance, and the Public

Complexity may provide a means of moving between the two poles which I have thus far considered in the terms of ethics—universalism and relativism. Some version of these poles also appears in theories of alliance politics or coalition formation. In her book *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Iris Marion Young (1990) argues that justice entails a "heterogeneous public and group representation" (183).²¹¹ While Young argues for "the justice of recognizing both specific needs of a group and rights of full participation and inclusion in the polity," she also identifies two poles of possibility for the question of how to accomplish the equality entailed in justice: "Those seeking social equality disagree about whether group-neutral or group-conscious policies best suit that goal and their disagreement often turns on whether they hold an assimilationist or culturally pluralist ideal. . . . I argue for the justice of group-conscious social policies" (173). This choice is detailed in Young's description of an ideal coalition:

The idea of a Rainbow Coalition expressed a heterogeneous public with forms of group representation. The traditional coalition corresponded to the idea of a unified public that transcends particular differences of experience and concerns. In traditional coalitions diverse groups work together for specific ends which they agree interest or affect them all in a similar way, and they generally agree that the differences of perspective, interests, or opinion among them will not surface in the public statements and actions of the coalition. This form ideally suits welfare-state interest-group politics. In a Rainbow Coalition, by contrast each of the constituent groups affirms the presence of the other as well as the specificity of their experience and perspective on social issues. In the Rainbow public Blacks do not simply tolerate the participation of gays, labor activists do not grudgingly work alongside peace movement veterans, and none of these paternalistically concede to feminist

participation. Ideally, a Rainbow Coalition affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the oppressed groups or political movements constituting it, and arrives at a political program not by voicing some "principles of unity" that hide difference, but rather by allowing each constituency to analyze economic and social issues from the perspective of its experience. This implies that each group maintains significant autonomy, and requires provision for group representation. Unfortunately, the promise of the Jesse Jackson campaign to launch a viable grassroots organization expressing these Rainbow Coalition ideals has not been fulfilled. (188–89)

There is, however, in Young's articulation of a heterogeneous public and group representation, no articulation of the complexity within and among groups. In her description of the Jackson campaign's instantiation of the Rainbow Coalition, Young eschews principles of unity and promotes groups' autonomy within the coalition but offers no description of what links them together as a coalition, nor of how their interrelation affects group or identity formation within the coalition. In this coalition, "Blacks" work with, they "do not simply tolerate" the presence of, "gays," yet, Young's description does not articulate how they work together, or how they challenge the interstice constituted by naming the autonomous groups "Blacks" and "gays." This interstice is produced and maintained precisely through a politics of difference or diversity that does not adequately articulate its correlative complexity. Thus, finally Young does not analyze why the Rainbow Coalition could not fulfill its promise. Once, again we are left with a call for (in this case) coalition politics which does not fully account for its historical failure (it is simply "unfortunate"). Specifically, Young's reading does not account for how persons and groups become "allies." Thus, Chantal Mouffe is critical of Young's description of coalition because it "is still conceived as a process of dealing with already-constituted interests and identities" (1992, 380) and, thereby, does not fully challenge the relations of production of "difference." If difference is produced as hierarchy and domination, then justice can never be achieved without changing these relations. As I have argued, persons and groups become allies through the activity of working in and through alliances. This constitutive process of alliance formation in which allies do not precede, but are rather the product of, alliances implies that individual and group identities do not necessarily dissolve but do change in becoming allies. Alliances fail, in part, because the work required by this process, the work of constructing (our)selves as allies in the spaces in-between identifications, is not adequately theorized.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) contribute by theorizing articulations, the connections between movements that are both necessary to sustain alliance or coalition and that partially fix the meaning of activism which are otherwise underdetermined. "Gay Rights, Special Rights" is, in part, a contest over the meaning of civil rights struggle. Whether civil rights

struggle is articulated as "minority protections" or "social justice for all" depends on whether civil rights is articulated with capitalist individualism or other struggles for social justice. If the meaning of (not special) "rights" is connected to capitalist individualism, then any rights claimed in relation to group oppression are special protections. If, however, the meaning of rights is articulated as fundamentally about social (not individual) justice, then civil rights legislation is about equal, not special rights. Ed Meese works to fix the meaning of rights in the former sense by locating legitimate rights as the purview of the unmarked individual. The analysis in chapter 4 suggests that his articulation is possible, in part, by dis-articulating connections among issues that civil rights legislation addresses, and that social movements could more effectively work to fix the meaning of rights in the latter sense by making connections among both issues and movements. Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe recognize that making connections not only shifts the meaning of activism, but also the identities of moral and political actors. For example, I have suggested that connecting anti-racist and anti-homophobic movement shifts and complicates the meaning of "lesbian community" and, hence, of "lesbian" in lesbian ethics described by Hoagland.

Laclau and Mouffe identify two poles around which contemporary politics works—autonomy and hegemony—poles which materialize the logics of difference and equality. Mouffe (1995) summarizes as follows:

Between the project of a complete equivalence and the opposite one of pure difference, the experience of modern democracy consists in acknowledging the existence of those contradictory logics as well as the necessity of their articulation: articulation that constantly needs to be recreated and renegotiated, since there is no final point of equilibrium where a final harmony could be reached. It is only in that precarious space "in-between" that pluralist democracy can exist. (43)²¹²

Despite their focus on the connections between movements and activism, Laclau and Mouffe spend very little time theorizing the space in-between autonomy and hegemony, which they identify as a space of "alliance" (141), in part because they use the narrow definition of alliance as only based on "given interests" (184). While they recognize that movements based on autonomy, alliance, and hegemony are all politically necessary, they value hegemony because it creates a new reality, a new "common sense" which partially fixes meaning for all the different elements of a social formation and, thus, (momentarily) secures a progressive meaning to the various terms (now moments): "For, nothing can consolidate anti-racist struggle more than the construction of stable forms of overdetermination among such contents as anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism which, left to themselves, do not necessarily tend to converge" (141). Thus, Laclau and Mouffe argue for the formation of a new

"common political identity" as the ideal outcome of articulatory practices. Mouffe later defends the need for this "common identity," because "The political community, as a surface of inscription of multiplicity of demands where a 'we' is constituted requires the correlative idea of a common good, but a common good conceived as a 'vanishing point,' a 'horizon of meaning,' something to which we must constantly refer but which can never be reached" (1995, 36).²¹³

Is, however, convergence and commonality the most useful conceptualization of the matrix which would materialize the type of social formation that they invoke as connecting "anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-capitalism?" Mouffe (1995) is herself critical of Habermas's "regulative ideal of free unconstrained communication" as "something that far from providing the necessary horizon of the democratic project, in fact, puts it at risk.... Any understanding of pluralism whose objective is to reach harmony is ultimately a negation of the positive value of diversity and difference" (44). The question is whether convergence and commonality are a necessary horizon, or whether they also ultimately operate to negate the positive value of diversity. At the very least, the focus on convergence leaves under-theorized the space "in-between," the space in which we currently work. It is unclear, for example, whether the various aspects of articulated movements must be grounded in a common sense or whether the network of connections can enable movements to work together without a common sense. The question is whether a common political identity or a hegemony will be able to protect diversity as Laclau and Mouffe intend, holding together in tension the poles of difference and equivalence. They wish to challenge the relations of production that currently produce "differences" and instead advocate a politics that shifts and reworks and remakes identities from those differences. But, what of the correlative complexity that accompanies diversity? Is a new "common" political identity the only possible site of a politically progressive and radically democratic "we"?

Laclau and Mouffe argue specifically that connections among multiple movements are made through a logic of equivalence. Equivalence works through the displacement of norms from one site of struggle to another. In the "equivalential-egalitarian logic" the norm of equality is displaced from its initial site identified by Laclau and Mouffe as the European democratic revolution—equality among citizens—to other sites of democratizing movement. So, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft "displaced [democratic discourse] from the field of equality between citizens to the field of equality between the sexes" (154). Gender subordination which was legitimate before the displacement is, through this activity, made illegitimate; women are claimed to be equal to men, just as all citizens are equal to each other. This move also makes social movements equivalent to one another. If women are equal to men just as citizens are equal to one another, then women are also equal to citizens and the

movements for democracy (equality for citizens) and women's rights (equality for women) are equivalent. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is on the basis of this equivalence that links among movements can be established, giving the logic of equivalence its power in articulating a progressive meaning for social movements: "For the defence of the interests of the workers not to be made at the expense of the rights of women, immigrants or consumers, it is necessary to establish an equivalence between these different struggles" (1985, 184).

The power of claiming equivalence is evident in the social movements—feminist, civil rights, human rights—which have time and again been founded upon it.²¹⁴ In practice the logic of equivalence has allowed claims for equality and rights to circulate among movements, but it has not been fully effective in connecting movements. As I argued in chapter 2, white feminist movements in the 1970s used the claim to equivalence as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, to displace the "equivalential—egalitarian" logic onto the terrain of gender relations. This displacement was used to extend equality to "women," to make "women's liberation" a topic of political movement, and to establish a (relatively) autonomous feminist movement. Yet, in part because it was a displacement of the logic of other movements, "women's liberation" failed through this move to (re)connect to the movements—civil rights and socialist or left—whose logic it displaced. The displacement that allowed the formation of autonomous movement simultaneously dis—articulated the work of persons whose work was articulated in more than one movement. Claiming equivalence did not make equivalent movements, nor did it connect movements to each other.

Laclau and Mouffe argue for the ideal of a radical and plural democracy, claiming that the norm of equality and the norm of liberty are mutually limiting terms, and thus, that the logic of equivalence must always be limited by a logic of autonomy: "[T]otal equivalence never exists; every equivalence is penetrated by a constitutive precariousness, derived from the unevenness of the social. To this extent, the precariousness of every equivalence demands that it be complemented/limited by the logic of autonomy" (184). Simply limiting equivalence by autonomy does not, however, articulate the complexity of relations among movements.²¹⁵ It does not fully theorize the complex space of relationship in—between autonomy and equivalence, the space of alliance. What type of links are necessary to connect movements in a radical and plural democracy, to articulate (in both senses of the word) the ways in which movements are both equivalent and remain different? It also fails to articulate the multiplicity of norms (in addition to equality and liberty) or "social logics" which are implicated in these relationships.²¹⁶ Thus, it fails to articulate relations among movements that do not trace their tradition (of norms and activities) to the (European) democratic revolution in the same way that Laclau and Mouffe do. As the examples from the chapters show, the logic of European

democracy is not the only logic which can circulate as part of articulatory practices. In chapter 3, for example, womanist and lesbian ethics/movements could be connected around the (different) critiques of western individualism that each offers.

By further theorizing the space of alliance it may be possible to articulate links among movements that are not constituted by the logic of equivalence. Such a move also opens the door to forms of political identity and movement that can be constituted between autonomous differences and a common identity.²¹⁷ In this sense, connections can be distinguished from commonality, so that while articulatory practices, the practices that produce connections, open the door to shifts in identities (and differences) they do not necessarily produce commonality. Articulations produce the possibility for shifting identities, but by being articulated these identities do not necessarily form a common political identity.²¹⁸

Nonetheless, because a common political identity is often held to be ideal or, if not ideal, to be necessary for political effectiveness, the shift away from unity is experienced as a loss. Naomi Schor, for example, describes the loss she finds as feminism has moved away from understanding itself as a movement founded in relation to commonality: "Now while some would argue that this commonality never existed except as a (false) universalism, I would argue that such a commonality, however contested, however limited in its geopolitical sphere of application, did exist in the early days of feminism and did make possible some of its greatest gains" (28).²¹⁹ She emphasizes the loss experienced in the shift away from this commonality as a loss of the ability of women to speak as the universal (relegating them forever and unnecessarily to the particular) and she also hopes to reinstate the hope of universalist movement with a "new" rather than "old" universalism. Schor articulates this hope by (re)articulating a series of issues that could be connected as "necessitating" a new feminist universal: "Determining what might constitute a specifically feminist universal for our time—which would, it appears, have something to do with a certain freedom of determination by women regarding what is done to their bodies (rape, sati, clitoridectomy, enforced sterilization, and enforced reproduction are some of the dubious practices that come to mind as necessitating a feminist universal to be combated)—presents a far more daunting challenge" (41). This is a complicated claim.²²⁰ The list works to specify the conditions "necessitating a feminist universal," and it achieves the type of displacement which Laclau and Mouffe describe as claims to equivalence, where bodily integrity or lack of bodily integrity (rather than inequality) is the term of equivalence. Such movement has been powerful and has led to gains for feminist movement. Certainly, for example, second-wave U.S. feminist movements to resist violence against women have been extremely powerful and made important gains—battered women's shelters, rape crisis intervention, women's self-empowerment,

sexual abuse survivors movements. And, yet, attempts to make these issues the issues of equivalence—the issues which all women share and which therefore form a basis of unity—led not to commonality, but to a splintering along a number of vectors, including across race and class lines, and in the (themselves sometimes violent) battles termed the "sex wars" (Jakobsen 1995a). Schor's list also exhibits the problems of such claims to equivalence. Schor is suspicious of some French feminist claims to universalism because "it is deeply informed by the particularity of French universalism and its ingrained inhospitality to differences" (41), an inhospitality tied to the history of colonialism and imperialism, and yet, this list is tied to precisely the same history.²²¹ Part of the problem here is the direction of displacement as it establishes movement from rape, thus constituted as the "center," to sati the "margin" made equivalent to the center. A certain type of power *is* lost by shifting from commonality to diversity and complexity, and for those women whose lives and issues are/were articulated by any given commonality, this loss would be a displacement from a center of power to the margins of that center. But, de-centering is not always dis-empowerment. As, Laclau and Mouffe argue, displacement can be a means of articulating power relations in new ways. I am suggesting that through alliances based not on commonality, but on diversity and complexity, other centers of power can be built, sometimes through displacements which work in different directions than the chains of equivalence described by either Laclau and Mouffe or Schor.

Diversity and complexity work in the space in between Young's description of a politics of difference where the differences are already given and simply need to be represented and Laclau and Mouffe's ideal of a common political identity constituted through chains of equivalence. Diversity articulated in and through complexity addresses the space of interrelation between the two poles. Complexity recognizes how identities and differences are constituted through relational activity and, thus, how they shift and change as a result of interaction. Complexity is a language that can also articulate the unevenness of the social. Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1994) suggest that under contemporary conditions where the social is not either fully modern or fully post(modern) "The question becomes how to link diverse feminisms without requiring either equivalence or a master theory" (19). Thus, they argue for "scattered hegemonies" as a way to describe the openings and inconsistencies in the social which are "the effects of mobile capital as well as the multiple subjectivities that replace the European unitary subject" (7). These multiple subjectivities must be engaged if alliances are to be formed. Yet, if the rainbow coalition or any other alliance is to sustain itself for any period of time, it must also be able to articulate the links which can be constituted in-between these differences. The process of building these links will undoubtedly shift the meanings and norms of different traditions, and yet, the telos of a new common

identity can threaten to write over the spaces and gaps in-between which are precisely the sites of alliance building. Thus, links can be built only by engaging the complexities of diversity and the limits of *différance* within, between, and among traditions and movements.

The focus on links between movements and subjects suggests a correlative shift in focus away from the search for community which has frequently marked both feminist movement(s) and theories.²²² Neither community nor the solidarity of collective action can be located in either a pre-existing common identity or in an overarching normative framework that holds together (contains within it) various differences. Iris Marion Young (1994) in her more recent work on "gender as seriality" suggests the need for conceptualizing "women" as the subject of feminist movement at different levels of relation. For example, by "gender as seriality," Young means women as an "amorphous collective" defined by "the fact that in their diverse existences and actions they are oriented around the same objects or practico-inert structures" (728). "Practico-inert structures" refers to a sedimented history of the production of gender difference. Feminist movement, however, is a grouping of women, specifically "in order to change or eliminate the structures that serialize them as women" (736). These distinct levels of collectivity show that the solidarity of feminist movement does not depend on, nor is its goal necessarily the creation of, a community of all women. Feminist movement may refer to the serial collective of women, but this collective is not an all-encompassing community. It is, rather, a series of subject positions created by relations and histories of the production of gender difference and resistances to that production. Young concludes, "This is why feminist politics must be coalition politics" (737).

The point of theorizing these different levels of connection is to dis-articulate solidarity from community and from identity. While community may be a result of solidarity, it is not a necessary pre-requisite to nor telos of movement. Analogously, solidarity does not depend on identity, nor is identity the necessary product of movement solidarity. Moreover, if a serial collective, a collection of locations in social histories which are also potential sites of identificatory practices is the referent for movement, then a specific identity is not necessary to the activity that is movement. Thus, what is required for movement is not an overarching community or a pre-existent identity, but action which creates articulations, which makes connections. Here we find the power of Ada María Isasi-Díaz's now famous statement (as quoted by Susan Thistlethwaite 1989, 25):

In a lecture at Chicago Theology Seminary, Ada María Isasi-Díaz was asked by a black woman in the audience, "How can women of color trust white women?" She replied that she had learned to trust white women who would "cover your back."

Isasi-Díaz is emphasizing relational action, not consensus, understanding, or shared community or identity as the basis of political alliance. 223

The connections, the spaces in-between, not the ground or frame, then, become the crucial sites for the action of making movement. These spaces can also be the site to de-stabilize normative regulation. While norms materialize identities and communities, the spaces in-between complicate and challenge the claims to coherence of norms, traditions and their materializations. For example, alliances can complicate the relationships among norms of "equality, liberty, solidarity," or "universalism, consensualism, egalitarianism," by placing these lists in relation to the "struggle for human wholeness," or "autokoeny." These complications re-make traditions and produce new values without necessarily re-solidifying, permanently fixing, a new normative tradition or establishing once and for all the value that is a "common good." Complications remain, as does diversity. Alliances shift locations and interests, and these shifts produce complicated and boundary-blurring relationships. Thus, alliances can do the work of pulling persons and groups out of their specific interests and identities and into newly articulated meanings and positions, while simultaneously maintaining commitments to and materializations of diversity and complexity.

Agency as Alliance, Alliance as Agency

In the past several chapters, I have argued against the logic of political movement that makes the formation of autonomous movement primary to the establishment of alliances. The assumption that an autonomous movement will precede alliance is part and parcel of the western logical assumption that singularity is the origin of diversity and of the enlightenment assumption that autonomy is the basis of moral agency. I have argued that diverse women's movements and activities preceded an "autonomous" predominantly white, middle-class, and heterosexual women's suffrage or women's liberation movement. It is this precedence which explains the diversity of *Sisterhood is Powerful*, the collection of which precedes the writing of the Introduction. I have also argued that diversity precedes autonomy in the sense that women and social movements are constituted in and through multiplicity. Singularity comes out of and remains intertwined with diversity, and the task of feminist ethics is to learn to work with this diversity and its accompanying complexity at the level of norms and values.

On this reading, alliance becomes the primary site for the construction of both moral agency and political effectiveness, thus, fundamentally shifting the site of agency from autonomy to alliance. Alliance is agency because that which both incites and enables agency is fundamentally relational. Engagement with "others" can create the initial disjunctions which form the incitement

to agency, the desire to move toward an alternative future. Such disjunction opens the door to reworking a given moral tradition in its relationships to others and the normative matrices that it engages.²²⁴ The realization of any alternative future is further dependent on relationships to effectively materialize it. For example, Angelina Grimké was moved to leave her Southern home, not simply because of high moral ideals, but, in part, because her engagement with others in the context of witnessing the brutality of punishment meted out to slaves created a disjunction with the genteel mores of her race and class position, opening up for her the possibility that there was something morally wrong with her own society. Yet, her ability to act in relation to this disjunction and her eventual production of moral agency as an abolitionist was dependent on relationships at a number of points. It was only through the opportunity to participate in Quaker communities and to join Sarah in Philadelphia and then to form alliances with African Americans that she was able to effectively act in relation to this opening and work for abolition. She was only able to act on the initial disjunction when she participated in a community that formed her as an ally, and some of the limits of this community formation also established her limits to be fully effective as an ally—the limits set by the "chord of prejudice" in white abolitionist movement.

Thus, the process of subject formation, of developing agency, also depends on others, on alliances. So, for example, second-wave feminist agency often developed out of "consciousness-raising groups" where the process of women coming together to discuss their situations as specifically social situations enabled individual women to change and feminist movements to form. Nelle Morton (1985) has termed this process "hearing into speech" in order to indicate the formation of (an individual woman's) speech as based on the social act of hearing (rather than an individual speaking the pre-existent truth-of-the-self which the group then "heard"). Agency is also constituted relationally, as a multiplicity, not as a unity. In this case, agency is constituted through solidarity that connected women's stories into social movement (s). Solidarity, thus, provides a way of constituting agency on the basis of diversity, so that both agency and diversity can be maintained. In choosing this way, the possibility of change and critique is located in several (diverse) places, thus, undercutting the narrative of a singular path to liberation, but also opening new opportunities for resistance and change that do not depend on access to such a path.²²⁵

The primacy of alliance is often resisted because it is supposed to be ineffective—complex and cumbersome, lacking clarity (Lugones 1994), and difficult to materialize. And, yet, the arguments of this book indicate that it is precisely those practices dedicated to unity and clarity, or to diversity without complexity, that can make U.S. social movements ineffective in their stated goals. Such practices, for example, led 1970s feminism to be unable to sustain

alliance with civil rights movements, made contemporary lesbian and gay politics open to the right-wing appropriation of "Gay Rights, Special Rights," and led feminist movement to founder on its inability to represent women. In each of these cases, problematic practices within movement led to an inability to form working alliances. Autonomous or coherent subject formation is often seen as the key to both moral agency and the possibility of social movements. As Cannon, Hoagland, and feminist theorists like Sharon Welch (1990) and Catherine Keller (1986) have pointed out, the assumption connecting autonomy and agency is itself tied to capitalist norms and an ethics of control. Thus, they suggest that a moral agency that effectively challenges these dominative norms must be grounded in relationships. The last several chapters have similarly suggested that the assumption connecting autonomy and movement is tied to the moral economy which produces the general public, and hence autonomous movement may only be effective in reiterating the general norm. Alternatively, connections or articulations among movements may be the key to reworking the "public" effectively. Thus, those who argue that a coherent identity is necessary for either moral agency or political effectiveness, who argue, for example, that "women" must constitute a coherent unit for feminist movement to be effective, miss the ways in which alliance is the basis of agency. ²²⁶ Diversity does not undercut agency, it complicates it. ²²⁷

The shift I am suggesting is not just that solidarity stands at a site between the two poles of "unity" (understood as coherence) and "diversity" (understood as unrelated differences), but also that solidarity shifts the site of agency away from identity and to alliance. At the end of his essay, for example, Pfeil suggests solidarity as a "way *through* difference" (225, emphasis in original), and he appeals to working together as the practice of constituting this solidarity. In this alternative understanding, solidarity is the precondition for an "I" who can work with others. The "I" who is an ally becomes so only in and through the process of working together ("with others"). Pfeil is here referring to some of his own experiences of working with alliances. My own education in alliance politics took place doing anti-apartheid work at the Washington Office on Africa. It was this work in a multi-racial, multi-national alliance that produced me as an ally. Thus, for example, before working at the Washington Office on Africa, "I" had absolutely no knowledge which was useful to "my" South African allies. It was only in and through working with them that the knowledge which I had (previously), for example, of white church-going constituencies *became* knowledge useful to them ("the others I work with").

In returning to the question I raised in the Introduction of producing "I" and "we" as subjectivities that name allies and alliances, the process that makes it possible for "us" to be allies, begins not with the assertion of an autonomous "I" who can then join a "we," or with a particular "I" who is subsumed by a general "we." Rather, the production of "ourselves" as allies

begins with the sets of interrelations within which we work and is enabled through the process of building particular sets of relationships. Thus, it is the articulations, the sets of relationships, that determine the possibilities for any given subjectivity, "I" or "we." For example, the production of a feminist movement that could challenge the sexism of left movements in the 1970s can be read as a process of shifting alliances, rather than as a process of asserting autonomy. Toni Cade reports such a shift as the move that enables Black women's struggles for liberation: "What characterizes the current movement of the 60's is a turning away from the larger society and a turning toward each other. Our art, protest, dialogue no longer spring from the impulse to entertain, or to indulge or enlighten the conscience of the enemy; white people, whiteness, or racism; men, maleness, or chauvinism; America or imperialism ... depending on your viewpoint and your terror. Our energies now seem to be invested in and are in turn derived from a determination to touch and to unify. What typifies the current spirit is an embrace, an embrace of the community and a hardheaded attempt to get basic with each other" (7). Thus, the subject of liberation is not pre-given, but is formed through the process of building particular relationships, and as Cade's list indicates such relational work, even if focused on a subject named singularly as "the community," always invokes diversity and complexity. Any such singular is built up out of and remains constituted by the relational plural.

The question in making alliances the subject of agency is how to understand this multiplicitous subjectivity. Amy Mullin suggests five methods of responding to multiplicity in the self, a multiplicity which is in part fueled by the diverse and contradictory norms, which the "self" embodies.²²⁸ Mullin names four of the methods as "assimilation, compartmentalization, toleration and negotiation" (1995, 10). Interestingly, she does not name the fifth alternative, the one that she advocates. She describes it as "the possibility in which confrontation, dialogue, and self-examination can lead to change in each aspect of the self" (9). Mullin provides a critique of each of the first four methodologies. Assimilation works to eradicate differences through hierarchical power relations that subsume or even eliminate those qualities deemed less good, central, or essential. Compartmentalization tends to assume that all "units" of difference are themselves coherent or homogeneous wholes, leading to the potential for a never-ending fragmentation. Toleration can accompany compartmentalization where each part manages its co-existence with the others, precisely by limiting contact and interaction among parts. Negotiation opens the door for interaction among the parts. It allows for commitment to a process of interaction, a commitment which enables ethical responsibility without the need to control the outcome through the institution of "one stable center of command, one voice with the final say" (18) (or in Benhabib's terms, one overarching set of criteria). For Mullin, the problem with negotiation is

that it depends on pre-given, in some sense coherent, if not homogeneous, entities to participate in the negotiation. ²²⁹ Mullin argues instead that a version of multiplicitous persons formed in and through social interaction is more helpful.

My suggestion of a name for Mullin's fifth option is "alliance." Alliance involves response-ability, contestation, and negotiation, but it is not fully articulated by any of these interactions. If even individual subjects of agency are formed from alliances, then alliance invokes not the coherent units of difference(s), but the complexity of relationships at the intersections of normative matrices. So, for example, the relationships between anti-racist and anti-homophobic movements described in chapters 3 and 4 are not negotiations between two clearly separate and bounded movements. The assumption of such separation fuels the iconography of "Gay Rights, Special Rights," that claims "people of color" are straight and "gays" are white men. If people of color names an alliance that, for example, connects but does not conflate race and ethnicity, that includes gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people and an alliance like "queers" connects, but does not conflate, radical sexualities and people of various races and ethnicities, then a much more complicated picture than that named simply by "negotiation" arises.

Complexity means that alliance is not the complete undoing of autonomy any more than it is the complete enactment of hegemony. Alliance is not the conflation of identities, as, for example, in the conflation lesbian-feminism which developed out of Johnston's initial attempts to ally women's and gay liberation, but led to the subsumption of lesbians under feminism that Hoagland resists with her (re)assertion of lesbian autonomy. Movement back and forth between autonomy and alliance will persist. Because alliance is located both in and between "identities" and "differences," it does not necessitate the abandonment of autonomy for alliance, but rather demands the maintenance of complexity. In the Introduction I mentioned the need for Women's Studies programs to engage with sites that exceed the boundaries of the category "women" if they are to fully engage the diversity and complexity of women's lives and activisms. The analysis of this book does not suggest, however, that this engagement is best addressed by merging programs or departments into a super-department of "other" studies that incorporates the various, currently distinct, areas of ethnic and cultural studies, or by "mainstreaming" women's studies so that it exists only in "general" departments. It should be noted that such moves are often umbrellas under which to cut administrative support, faculty lines, and other resources to programs that challenge traditional curricula. This outcome should not be surprising, not only given the current conservative climate of educational budget cutting, but also for reasons suggested in the examples in this book. The attempt to subsume particular sites of study under general rubrics (whether the "main" stream or the "other") undercuts

diversity and complexity in precisely the ways outlined in chapter 4, where those least marked by particularity are most empowered to represent the general. Thus, we could easily find a "cultural" studies, once again dominated by privileged white males as the "general" representative of diverse areas of study, including ethnic and women's studies. The alternative to the attempt to find a general rubric under which to combine areas of study is to work to develop a network of interrelations through which to connect and ally diverse areas. In this arrangement the various sites of study are nodes in the network and work must be undertaken to build articulations, work that will change, but would not necessarily merge, the nodes themselves. It could, ultimately, break down current boundaries and administrative divisions, but merger is in no way the ideal outcome. Rather, the ideal is to both maintain diversity and work through the complexities of making connections.

Working Alliances, Moral Economies: Politics and Ethics

Normative matrices materialize moral economies within which differences are produced. Intertwined identities and differences are produced through reiterations of the norm, reiterations that materialize the norm, giving it embodiment. Normative reiterations are productive, they produce the possibilities of subjectivity, but they are also constraining and constrained by the relations of production. The coercive demand to produce oneself as, for example, a gendered being is not under contemporary relations of production avoidable. Materialization of any norm is never complete, however, and it simultaneously produces excess. This excess creates the need for social enforcement, but it also opens the door to play on the "original" norm, the space of originality that is new and different. Play does not mean a space of total freedom from constraint, but it is a site of struggle over norms and possibilities for change. Play is, thus, serious business, but it also materializes imagination and creativity. Social movements, meaning movements of and for different enactments, create possibilities for changing the shape of a normative matrix or producing new norms. Thus, empowerment, constraint, and change can exist simultaneously, delineating a site of moral labor named "agency." 230

Under contemporary relations of production, differences, along lines of gender, race, class, and sexuality are produced as dominations. Moral economies are relatively autonomous, overlapping, and interrelated, thus, they create the complexity and contradictions of inter-locking dominations that simultaneously institute segregations and gaps in social relations. Within these relations of production, moral economies of differentiation are linked as hierarchical binaries to a dominant moral economy that produces the "general public." So, for example, the economy of gender produces women as different from men and in so doing also produces men as normatively "general." The

general is reproduced across moral economies as (repetitive) hierarchical binaries, the effect of which is a loose network of binaries where each binary both is separate from and reinforces the others. These conditions, the simultaneity of interrelation and segregation, make for the complexities of social movement. As the reading of Sojourner Truth points out, the domination against which African American women work is produced by shifting among binaries. For example, at points, African American women, Sojourner Truth among them, were denied a claim in the gender economy; they are not normatively women, and thus must be shifted to the economy of race, but at the moment of enfranchisement they were not normatively raced and are shifted back to gender, pinned to the identity of disenfranchised women. This structure induces social movements both to struggle separately, addressing themselves only to single binaries, and to reiterate, and thus reinforce, the general norm. Marginalized groups focus only on the "center" and claim a place for themselves in the center, and relations among marginalized groups are ignored, producing the sites at which moral economies intersect as interstices, gaps, or silences. Thus, as analyzed in chapter 2, in order to constitute itself as an autonomous movement, women's liberation replicated the dominant economy of the same, thereby erasing Black women's movements as *women's* liberation and failing to form connections to movements of poor and working-class women or to materialize the gay/feminist alliance, despite the expressed longing for connection.

These conditions make for the difficulties of producing working alliances and the ineffectiveness of repeated calls for alliance formation that do not take complexity into account. Alliances have been invoked in the context of a liberal politics of diversity or a more radical, but still flawed, feminist politics of "differences." Both liberal diversity and feminist "differences" fail to address the economies within which differences and the complexity of relationships among differences are produced. Because norms both empower and constrain the material possibility of subjectivity or agency, the political project of producing working alliances is also a project in ethics.

In order to build alliances, one must be able to work with the complex interrelations among moral economies so as to produce intersections as articulations, connections among struggles, and as resistances. One must also be able to work with the diverse and complex norms produced by "communities of resistance and solidarity" (Welch 1985). Chapter 3 investigated different moral traditions that have been produced at the intersections of moral economies. *Black Womanist Ethics* names the moral tradition of African American women's struggles at the intersection of gender, race, and class to "prevail against the odds with moral integrity" (Cannon 1988, 2) and to actualize "an inclusive human community" (169). *Lesbian Ethics* names the work of lesbians producing values, making choices under conditions of constraint, and taking

the relational risks to make a "moral revolution." Despite the intersections between these two texts given the ways in which sexuality is racialized and race is sexualized while both are gendered and classed, the differences represented by these traditions cannot be resolved through an assumption of unity or some singular focus on oppression.²³¹ Nor is such a resolution or unification either necessary or desirable for the work of effective resistance to domination to which they are committed. As chapter 4 demonstrated, working alliances require working with the excesses of differentiation, work that occurs in-between, rather than being contained within, particular differences.

Working in the spaces in-between makes room for the type of interaction among groups that changes norms and identities, interaction which is not accounted for in the "Rainbow Coalition." As Ranu Samantrai (forthcoming) points out in her study of Black British politics in the 1980s,

Conflicts between constituencies cannot be resolved through either assimilation or multiculturalism, both of which presume that norms defining communities remain undisturbed as groups encounter one another.... A pluralism capable of addressing the complexity of contemporary British racial and gender politics would recognize the value of dissent which interrupts attempts to consolidate boundaries and maintain stable norms. Such a pluralism would build upon conflict in order to challenge the inclusions and exclusions through which majority and minority constituencies, and the resulting norm of a fundamentally white Britain, are maintained.

Working in-between is the labor necessary to materialize possibilities for a complex pluralism, a pluralism that recognizes the complexity of interrelation between the poles of unity and diversity.

Working in-between is both a means of living in and amongst social change and of creating room for on-going change, affirming a commitment to "a world that needs changing" (Bammer 1991). The question of ethical method is not one of finding the overarching values which frame all others, but one of reworking the multiple values of the various traditions in and between which we work. In this sense, ethics is a language for an on-going way of life, not for a single answer to a moral dilemma.

These questions are part of social processes which create moral knowledge by articulating rather than naturalizing "the politics of ethics."²³² Ethics, thus, works to enable rather than foreclose political struggle. The priority of ethics shifts from resolution of conflict to creation of new possibilities for communities and relationships. Yet, ethical language is always limited by social conditions. Thus, constructing feminist ethics is only one part of a complex set of resistances addressing the nexus of ethical discourse, political practice, and social conditions.

How does one undertake this work, however, without either re-iterating a telos of eventual unification or abdicating ethical responsibility for the direction of activity? A shift in ethical conceptualization from responsibility to response-ability

may go some distance in explaining how one can work in alliances without being trapped either in or between these two poles.²³³ Because the language of response-ability is not a moral perspective, but a language of interaction, it allows for recognition of partiality and openness to others without having to protect its coherence. Response-ability names the skill of working in relationships, of responding to moral claims made from various locations while also recognizing the normative power of one's own (diverse and complex) commitments. Response-ability names the on-going process of working to resist and contest dominations and the responsibility of producing new norms and articulating democratic values under conditions of constraint.

The conclusion of this book is, thus, not an end, but a starting point, a point from which to move forward with new ways to understand the work we are doing and to formulate questions about what work we should do in the future, work in the spaces in-between that can produce us as allies. "We" can be connected without being identified. We can work together.